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i ntrt:)dL1ct ion 
Islamic fundamentalism, also known as Islamicism or 
Islamic revivalism, is a move ment that has become much more 
visible 1n the last TWO nPr~ n P~- Fundamentalist groups n a ve 
in many Middle Eastern nations, 
' .... DL\ t- Tc.l~ff1'1r 
1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, i n which r adical Shi'ites 
se1zea po~er from the Shah and his monarchy. A decade later, 
. . ~ -
regime ma1nTa1ns power, ma ny Tc:.1 2-m ir 
funrl~mPnt~li ~t groups and parties have o rolifer a ted 
Although Tney oo noT hnlrl ~nwPr 
1n any other country, 1n many nations Islamic fundamentalists 
are exerT1ng great pres sure on po11T1cs and socieTy. This 
situat i on rai ses important questi ons about the nature of s uch 
they have grown. 
~"'-" =,n-,n 1 .:=. 
- ... . ·"·-·:. - . -
Thi :=. ~ .=a-n.o :-~ -:...~ r · :....: to 
Salvation Front of Algeria as an 
1 r1 
the imposition ot 
Sccundary goals include a return 
!o..&.-». - --
=-~"-·:::c..- ~; ~ prohibition of alcohol 
consumption , and a gene ral rejection of Western culture and 
\/alue=- = Membe;ship in revivalist f"lrn!!D'=. -cp-f l Pri:c:. +: ~- : P 
-::ii. - -·r - - - - - - - - - - .. -
largely of the young 
that will be discussed later ~nese ~-~~1~ are ~ne most 
likely to be attracted to Islamic fundamentalism . 
On e imp ortant fundame ntali st group that is impacti ng the 
its society is the Islamic ( FIS ) 
As in other Mi ddle Eastern societies, Islamic 
f undamentalists in Al geria h ave a 1arge potential pool of 
of AlgeTian-=- are S unn i 
The FIS is t yp ical of revivalist 
g roup s a r ound the Middle East, as it has risen i n oppos1~1on 
to a secu lar-style government c urr ently facing Prnnnmir 
di f-f i cL~l t ies= F unrl ~ mPnt~ li ~m and Islamic politica l thought 
do not represent a new phenomenon , they 
Algeria's hi s tory a nd of ~ne Lul r=iiL popu1 ar1~y o f the FIS 
s uggest strongly t h at, despite p ositi v e motivations it o ffers 
to members, the movement is largel y a negati v e reaction to 
CLirrer,t not 
-
because of religion but because i t o ~~er s an alternative to 
the unpopular FLN g overnmen~ . This reactive nature OT the 
front, as well a s conditions both internal and e xter nal ~o 
the move ment, wil l make it difficult Tor it to succeed in its 
Isl ami c Influences in Alger ian Hi story 
To better understand the current role of Islamic 
fundamentalism in Algeria, it is h elpful to exami n e i t s 
history a nd it s cffeLL~ in Algeria, as political move ments 
like revi v alism are largely recurrent 199()) ::: 
characteristic of past movements often helps exp1a1n a nd 
T ~ 1 .=:a:.z 
- - - . -· -·:- l i \ted and died 
1n wha t 1s now Saud i Arabia, but this did not prevent his 
life from becoming a model for P ,,,J µr;../!.,&.lr!Pr .P -
-·-· I""•• - • -~ 
i r1 Al g e r i a = Islamic forces reached Algeria wi th in ~wo 
rl Pr~rlPG of the Prophet's death 1n 632 AD and, despi te initial 
res~Gt a nr ~ Trom the native Berbers, gai ned a po we r and 
In Alg e ria, as i n other Arab nations, the Islami c rel ig ion 
blended with Ar~ hir and North Afric a n cu1~ure ~o produce the 
b e ginning of moaern Middle Easte rn 
consideration oT I s lam as part of Arabic c ul t ure 1s important 
to Alg e rians , and the r e fore i t mus t oe important for ~ne 
individual a nd group hPh ~vinrG that compri se Algerian 
An e xaminat ion of the life of Moh a mmed s h ows clearly that 
n:rpc _c _!1r~c_ tr! 
r· ---- - - ·- --
spread ~ne wor d of Al lah . Both with in Mecca and i n hi s l a t e r 
life, Mohammed took ~nv~n~~~P of power - building techniques 
such a s marryi n g hi s daughter s 
mPrli~tin~ r nnflirt ~ for o ther gr~ups. He even utilized 
199(}) .. 
Thus began a 1ong relationship betwee n politics and ,~1~m= 
politi cs was used by Mohammed for religious purposes. Dur i ng 
that 2ra Mohammed ano his followers used political means ~o 
spread Islam; ~ooay, Islam itself is often used to carry out 
.. . ~ . .. po11~1ca 1 goa1 s. 
sections of this paper. 
Islami c-era Algerian soc iety was rel atively unbothered 
occupation which lasted from 1519 until 1830 1986) = 
Ottoman rule wa s far fro m harsh, and ' ' lDCdl 
representatives of the Emp ire lar gely allowed life to g o on 
1..:.Jr:rnc. _ 
--- - - · - :;s little need for Islam to 
It was not until the French took control of Algeria that 
blossomed (Vatin , 1981 , p.125). The French occupied Algeria 
the e nd of Algeria ' s wa r Tor 
indepe ndenc e in 1962 (Entelis, 1986) = Th e h arsh nature of 
the Algerian nat ion int o armed 
·:i-.c=,c; c:-t- =,·nr :::::. 
........ .. .. . . -: lent itself= 
~~~~~gp~ r~n h P used effect ively to resist government or 
outside forces because OT t he ir . Islam was the religion of 
~ne lar ge majority of Algerians, and could more l Pgit im~tPly 
i::na.11 cc~Lt l d p -3 t. r i i) t i =-m 
s tate. 
t- ' . 
,..-n1=- art l -f i c i al 
There 1s ver y little aoua~ that , n owever profound ~ne 
rPm~i n P rl : ~it was the disruptive nature of French colonial 
policy that ultimately provoKeo the aggressive reassertion of 
an 1no1genous Algerian irlPntity wi~n strong ties to native 
Islamic culture" (FntPli~, 1986, p.76). The result was an 
int egr ation of Islam into A]gerian nationalism. 
cer t ainly gave nat ive Algeri ans reason to protest: the 
i nf a mous Cod e de l'Indigenat imposed by the French in t he 
1830s for b ade native Algerians from s p eaking agains t Franc e 
or its government. In addition, the Code made it illegal for 
Algerians to travel i n the ir own country without a special 
permit <Entelis, 1986 ) . At the same time, a number of 
prefere nti al treatment, courtesy o f Tne Fren ch governmenT 
A prominent leader of early Algerian resistance to rrance 
,=, 1 -K ;c, d ,=,;- _ t>-1h .-. 
- - .. -- - ·-. ~ . . .. -
~ , . 
1c.1.qm 1 r 
mystic ism, and orthodox Tsl~m to rally Algerians around him 
1986 ) = culture 
... - .. -
roie in cnoos1 ng Islam as the resistance's 
In fact, many Muslims did and s till oo equate 
Islami c ach ievement with Arabic ~rhi P vPmPnt 1982) = 
The messa ge of po lit ical freedom was in this case, ho~ever, 
con sidered more important than the messenger, Islam. 
in 
hv 
- , AJger i2r1 It 
happened~ however, that the best method for Algerians to snow 
their dissatisfaction was t hrough el-Kader's movement. 
Algerians found it convenient to joi n a movement that both 
criticized the despised French imperialism and was dedicated 
c onditions of the time 
compel Algerians to r ally around a central figure; 1n this 
case that leader was el - Kader. 
Th e e arly resistance to the French met the important goal 
of forming a treaty with ~ne French when el-Kader signed the 
Trea t ·y L?f TafT1a in 1837:1 but 
of the movemen~ prought neither lasting peace nor autonomy to 
Algeria (Entelis~ 1986) ; The Fren ch gradually s trengthened 
::=i·~J .=. 1- - r, ·c pc_p\f r: 
-·-· r· ----· - iii Al C!Pr"i .=.n 
politics 1n the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
Ferhat Abbas 1n ~ne 1930's and 40's. ~ -.; -! c::_ ! 2-~T:1 r 
thought was scarcely represented 
\ 
, , . 
,on1·y \tague1y "t.L) elicit 
• s ~ ~ ... • ~ • s 1n ~naT coa11~1on ~ ano was 
support from the general 
A~~imil~tinn with equality was an unassertive 
1986~ This plan was Too unassertive 
for some, however. It prompted Ul ama leader Shaik Abd al -
,--~· 
[This 
patria of its own with its well recognized borders'' (Cher iet~ 
1 992 ~ t=! : 1 (J ) =: Ulama and other movements in the succeeding 
decade were to provide a s trong nationalist alternative To 
Assimilationi sm. 
accept, and many were co nfident that it would find s uccess. 
Ahh~~ w~~ o p timistic when, in May 1945, disaster struck hi s 
a peaceful pro- autonomy 
dissat isf ied Algerians began a riot 1n the small city of 
Th e 
French-controlled state army, police , ana European s ettler 
In the aftermath, the pP~relnv~ng Ahha~ was 
imprisoned , his ~oli t ical organi z ation , F r iends of t h e 
Ma n ifP~t n and Liberty, w~~ h~nnPrl, and hopes for liberal 
reformism i n Algeri a were quickly rl Pv~~t~~Prl (Entelis, 1986 ) . 
De spite t he compromising nature of reformist AlgPri~n~, 
this re~r ~1nn maoe 
.. - ~::::::. ! ,=!"!:~ii :.= 
. ·- . . ·..: . . . . . . then 
mo vement wh ich was gaining prominence in other Arab countries 
It "aimed at rP~sGPrtin0 the Islamic iden tity 
p. 42) = Mor e importantly, it was a precursor to t he 
r e volut i ona ry group that finally ended French imperiali s m in 
Al s o important during the pre-revol utionary period 
in Algeria was the Ulama moveme nt of Ibn Badis. 
pc~ l it i cal '=' 11 rr:ark e d 
culture and language of the national 
move me nt ••• . Through their extended ne twork of [school s] and 
scout organizations, t he Ulama exposed hundreds of c hildren 
of the cities to the s logans of nationa li s m'' ( Cheriet, 
Seen in a historical context, the S alafiyya and Ulama 
move ment s wer e signifi c ant hPr~u~e nnrP ~g~ in a political 
movement called for change with Islam as a basis. They t hus 
demonstrated t h at the i dea l s first defended in the early 
resistance a gai nst France were still alive in Algeria, even 
after 100 year s of struggle. 
finally formed the Revol utionary Committe~ for Unity and 
Action (CRUA) (Entelis , 1986). This a ssembly was committed 
to adopting violent means where compromise had failed, and on 
1954:-
1986) ~ 
Alger ian s both to r egai n their honor and to advance ~nri~llv 
. 
The independence 
It also demonstrated the continuing nature of the 
incorporation of Islam against state power 1n Algerian 
a ceasefire was rlPrl~rPri in 1qAp_ 
Post - Independence 
The s u bsequent Algerian regime was first led by Ben Balla, 
a m11 1~ary leader of th e FLN. Significantly, the Islamic 
rhetoric that was so important before ana during th e 
revo lution was still r ecognizable in the programs of nis and 
real goal ~Ta ~nri~li~t state (Addi, 1992). 
included the not ion of egalitarianism, wn,rn; li ke other 
..... "t. • 
l ~-l. a:Til C a =:-!F"!-3J.. 1 part f.)f 
socialist Algerian state 1992) = 
In 1965, there was a military ~aKeover led by the 
President's c n1eT DT staff, Houari Boumediene, who took 
the ,_: d ecade 
~ . .. . . .. . \ 
r11 =· D 1 !=-C 1 p 1 i neo miY1d 5 
\ , • l ~ 
was grea~ 1y 1mpor~an~. He 
.. .. . \ governmen~ ana soc1e~y 1986) = The 
::::-, ;;~?-~"':..•O ·,-
, :.,_-':'::-::- ~ -= :i'. was the loss of public 
participation in the political r..rr:r ~.:::c.: r··" ,,_-~~-·-- 198-t.) ,. 
a decade 5 r~eed 1976 a 
new National Charter was approved an overwhelming margin 
LU 
(Entel is, 1 '?86) = The new charter's empnas1s on political 
participation and a v ictory in the following Presidential 
election served to legitimize the rule of Boumediene. The 
Alger ian p r e~irlPnt died in 1978, but he left behind the 
legacy of a stable national leadersh ip. In addition, Algeria 
under Boumed iene introduced socialist programs, such as free 
rapid industrialization <Entelis, 1986)= 
pos itive by the g overnment and by many ~ . . Tore1gn oaservers, 
these changes have more recently given ::-. ~ . H1.ger1ans:- e~.pec i a 11 ) 1 
Islamic fundamentalists, cause for complaint, and the 
revivalist movemenT that has resulted is the focus of t his 
Chadli RPniPrlirl~ the most r ecenT president of Algeria, 
took power after the elections of 1979, making it a priority 
to reform the corruption t h at plagued the credibility of his 
FLN ana the governmenc 1986) = 
governmental i nsti tutions over ''residual regional and tribal 
{Cher iet; 1992 ) = nr .. 1 1 r..._J :----f 
modernization - minded technocrats i n Benjedid's gover nment 
wer e simi larl y unsympathetic to o t her r1rrt ~ !~-1c. 
'::::!- " - --~ -
1992)::: 
r,r. 1 ; 2- ..; i:=:.=: =i. l c.-2 :· ·· - - .. - - - - . --- antagoni zed stude n ts, femin ists 
Entel is). A host of other problems--economic, political and 
social--has befallen Algeria in the last decade , a nd 
r12=:-
criticism from the FIS. To its cred it ~ in the 1as~ decade 
~ne FLN governmen~ has allowed increased public dissent and 
discussion in the form OT legalized oppos 1~1on parties. This 
the t h e government would be 
in ' ' . a more oemocra~ic 
Despite the intentions of ~ne FLN, the lnnsPning OT 
in Algeria seems tr) h a .... /e 
Throu g h out the 1980's, different Algerian 
interest groups protested and demonstrated agai n st t h e 
g o v e rnment, beginning with the Berber s in 1980 (Cheri et, 
1992) = Throughout the decade other anti - government g r oups 
aecame more active, most notably the FIS, other ~ , . 1s1am1c 
fun damentalists and fPminis~~ 1992) = 
sign of the growing di scord in c ontempor a ry AlgPria-
differences among 
FI S itself, but the external conflict with the government has 
r-~re'·./er1t:ed t hese cracks from 1988 :i 
Tn ere were fundamentali s m- inspired riot s duri ng e1ec~1on 
the vi n lPnrP has ' . ' C{)T1'I=l T;Ll20 si r1ce 
ch:=-n1ce ~ J! 1991) = After violen ce e rupted duri ng the May 
c~mp~igning period for ~haL were to be June election s in 
emergency in a n attempt to calm the young, p oor ~ rli~G~tiGfiPrl 
urb an class that was a main cau se of the v1oien ce C"AlgPri~ 
Suc h unrest has played into the hands of 
the the F IS~ which, in the true spi rit of po l i t ical 
' ' . cnar ac 1:=er 1 ze=- {) f 
Islamic revivalist thought. The FIS further fans the fl~mPG 
of viol e nce by encouraging violence among a na recru1~ 1ng from 
the young urban poor ( Gibb i n s, 1991). 
As even non- fundamentalists the F IS ana 
government are not =-.c~ 1 \te'd ~ 
sys~em installed b y t h e F LN h~G f~ilPrl to be the panacea i t 
~ven a near-perfect form of governmen~ , 
though , would h a ve had difficulty and fLtriding 
Algeria~ =-
considered to be an excellent model of rapid 
industriali~ation for the rest of the third world, there are 
side effects of thi s modernization. As one author writes , 
''Industrialization has led inevitably to urbaMization and the 
creation of a rootless proletariat cut off from its former 
This proletariat is 
compr1sea largely OT young unemployed urban dwellers . inree 
out of four young A1~Pri~n~ are jobless, and many live 1n 
urban slums, often seven to a room and with their e xtended 
families ("I s lam and," 1991). These urban residents spend 
the ir T.lffi2 finar:cial ly ar1d 
spiritually frustrated" (Gibbins, 1991, p.32). 
Such conditions lead to a myriad of family problems. 
Incest is rampant, especially between grandparents and 
grandchildren (Gibbins~ 1991)= Sons are often envious of 
their economically secure fathers, who can often afford to 
h ave a second, much younger w1Te. In contrast, the younger 
generation is often unemployed with little chance of marriage 
or s elf- support (Gibbins, 1991). Situations such as this 
increase young Algeri ans' especially in 
cities like "Such people, seeking ~-{) m e identity, 
cause or just dignity , are the recruiting ground and the 
The fast pace of Algerian modernization nas led to close 
contacts with the West, 
1981)= 
outside the Muslim wor ld fo r ~Frhnnln~ir~l ' . ana economic ne1p, 
government is therefore seen as an enemy for yet another 
it has opened the floodgates for Western-style 
"deca dent" forms of entertainment. In the last five years, 
1991)= 
have closed night cltl~ ~ , music halls and brothels that 
offende d their sensib ilities, but that were a1so a way for 
young people to relieve stress (Gibbins, 1991). 
longer possible Tor many Al~~ri ~ n ~ to even nave a cup of 
coffee at a sidewalk cafe, as these places, too, were found 
anti-Islamic and s hut down by rad ical r evivalists (Gibb i ns, 
These measures have f ur ther isolated a nd frustr ated 
young Algerian s, i roni cally making the m more likely to be 
leaders. 
important role in the ri se o f Is l amic fundamentalism and the 
FIS. 
0 The fundamentalist 
p h e nomenon is the result of a 
~n ~~ ihility of taking part in politi c al 1 1Te, in the 
a dm i ni s tration OT the had rn::, 
fro m the mosques " Frnnnmir progress 
and modernization have admit t e dly come at the price of 
political participation. The one- party Alg e rian political 
s ystem a nd government h~vP hPPn closed to a ll but party 
memb e r s, a n d little attention has been pa id to oppos itionists 
s uch as the FIS until recently. 
their fundame n tal ist message have always b een ~v~il ~ hlP to 
The con stant exposure of Algerian s to the 
lack c,f 
with the g overnment has led many to joi n the FIS as ~neir 
.... . ~ . ... 
!=!{)l 1 "t:1.Cctl 
the ma j ority of its Mi ddle 
opposition sucn as ~ne Islamic Salvation Front, resulting in 
the current desperation Tor a share in the government on the 
i~s own g o als are ' '. 02fi1()Cr a L l C :1 the FIS that 
even a ~m~ i 1 voice in official politics is better than the 
recent treatment by the government. The FIS is not alon e 
when it call s for d emocracy. Pressure for democratic 
elections has also come Trom oroinary voters, 
and 
Despite all the probl ems that make Algerians turn to the 
very important positive motivation that lP~rl~ th~m to join 
1n1s motivation, cultural identi ty , is probably 
the most important rnnP~~vP force for Algerian 
fundamenta l ist s= As one a uth o r states 
~! ~ 76 ) = that confront many poor 
' ' ' re~urn ~o one·s own sense 
of culture and pri de t-~c.~- -i + .=. t:.i..=.-: --- . - ·- - ··...:. · -
held by many Algerians of their Islamic culture is 
understandable, espec ially in light of the exp loitation ano 
c t::;r:-uptic~n that they have survived las t 2(H) 
On ~ne o~ner hand, t h ere a re those who fi nd fault with 
me mbers' rationale fo r joini n g the FIS. 
16 
general Abdelhamid Mehri offers this cr1~1que of FIS me mbers ' 
motivations Tor joining the party: "There is a frustrated 
asp 1ra~1on in some people who ao no t r eally know 1s1am ana 
( Gi bbins, 1991, p.32 ). This view OT FIS membership, although 
harsh , has s~r ong basis in fact. Me hri takes into account 
the 10w social standing of many of 
~) rDne tr:: be ., . ~ . ., pr)l 1 L2ca1. 1 • ... 'l ~:; n 11 £)=:.t::pr1er =· 
d e t ermine that j oining or acting with the FIS 1s the best 
course of action for the f u ture of Algeri a. 
1n many o~ner Middle ~~~~Prn states, 
desperate and has nothing to lose <Bil l , 1990) . The· .. / dt) 
shar e some important goa1s with Ts l~mi r f undamentalist 
leaders , such as a red istributi on of wealth, but members' 
hopelessness makes it mi ~ l P~rli n c to characterize sucn 
indiv idual s as highly rei1g1ous . This evaluation 1s 
corroborated by the traditional view o f Algerians as not a 
, ~ -.-.+e:l ;,;::; 
... : . .... -· =-
19865 r, ,;.- } r·=-·=--··= revival ist cl ergy take advantage 
of the current si tuation and u se the poorly i ntegrated lower 
c1ass to further their o wn goals. During the riots last 
for e xamp le, many Al g iers youths might have 
-~-r - - - · .. r-·~·-.,_- ~: -:...., ..=. ~ney we re antagonized "by 
t t1 ·2 tear ma '=:.k'=:. a nd 
steps off," 1991, p . 44) . As they began to fight back , 
FIS c+.e:!~ =:!ir rl<!::. . .. . - -· . . . . . =- t<c)r a11=:. ~ All ahLt 
akbar ['God is great'] and calling for an Islamic republic, 
Although Islam is highly important as a religious, 
cultural and political force it is crLH:ial to 
~o resist governmen~ or foreign oppression is only half the 
C Tr,-Y-":..'-. 
- · -:..·.._·z 7 :ii i I1 g o vernment, too, has used po litical 
1 ··.? 
I~-lam !!=-lam 1s not a new idea; 
1s1am has been u sed to 1 .0 111 ; + ; m; -::r .c: J., ,._._ ••••••••• •• ~ ' a1reaay empower ea 
systems si nce ~ne ~1 me oT Mohammed. Th is concept dates back 
to Koranic verses s ucn as: 
those 1n authority o ver you" ( Bill, 1990, p.49) . The FLN-
c ontro lled g overnment h as take n this message to h ear t . In 
Algeria , there are government - appointed loca l clerics, the 
g ove rnmen~ states its policies in T~l~~i~ ~erms, and FLN 
Algeria J ~ - the FLt~ 1 s 
... ' ~ 1eaaers ~o pursue a 
Pr nnnmir growth, the use of advanced technology a n d 
sc i e nt ific know- how, ana rl P~PnrlPnrP nn Western secular ists 
. . . ' ~ . . . . ~ 
aam1n1s~ra ~ 1ve, organ1za~1ona1 a nd financial expertise" 
that is nominal ly consistent even with Islam ' s strict 
The Islamic S a lvation Front, then , may well 
have a legitimate claim to Islamic belief, but, at least 1,, 
tt-ie ~i't)litical arena:1 it 1~- r:;c:st a c::.in~iil.=tr claim,,. 
If I ~-1 am i c i =-ts nn?t-.!Pr r- ··-· 1n Algeria, 
the new government would be similar to 1 ~ ..,,. • i::ne 1ran1an 
be the prefer1-ed 
West coul d be strained. The empowerment of the FIS ~~~!rl 
likely, as its candidates won 55% of the 1 {)Cal 
vo~e in the 1988 e lections. Additionally, the party claimed 
49% of Parliament seats with outright major ities in the 
December 1991 P1Prtinn~ f !J T J 1·.-i:-= j] : : "--"= :: : :i 
The road to a successfu l FIS r egime, nowever, 1s by no 
mP~n~ a clear one. After the P1Prtinn~ o~ 1qqq 
-- ......... .,__.:i t:he FLN 
gprrym~nner Pn pnlitic~l boundaries in its own favor, slightly 
diminishing the FIS' electoral popularity ("Algeria steps 
Df-f :1 n 199.l):: I t is more ~ignifir~nt that the R~l v~t i nn 
n.:-: 1 ..; ·i"; r-!: :·· . . - -- . - - l 11 
years has been unimpressi v e ("Another chance," 1991). ine 
fact that the FIS' r~rlir~l aspirations are inching closer to 
12?91) = +~ l l -i •~n -·- . - . -··..: fact. 1S ea·~-1,./ 
politics, lP~~Pnin~ even TLir~ner the FIS ' rn~nrPs for 
SLlC CE'SS= 
Current State of 
The curren~ repression DT the FIS and other 
,_1c:,=,. -.,-!' .,_ ~- 1: 
·\ C'j 
p oli tica l par t ies by t h e g o ver n ment 1s of great interest t o 
f undame ntal i s m wil l fa re in conf lic t s i n other par t s of the 
Th e curr e n t Alger ian c onfr o n t ation began o n Janua ry 
' ' ~ ....::. :i 
1 qq;:; 
- .· .- =- " to the s urp r i s e o f ma n y, President Chadli 
Ben j ed i d s teppe d down . t he ar my stepped in t o 
c onveni ent l y been 
Ben j e d i d di sso lve d r-. .. . .. r- :: r arii a men~ a Tew weeKs ear i1er. Th is 
rni n r~ rl ~ n r P h as caus ed s peculation that Ben jedid was somehow 
Df hi s 
involvement in a n d s uppo rt for the p l an ar e unk n own. In 
additi o n to tak i n g p o we r , th2 army a i s o nu l l ified t h e 
DPrPmhPr 26, 199 1 elect i on r e sults, i n which the F IS h a d wo n 
a n o u tr i ght major i ty in 49% DT Parli a me n t' s 430 sea t s 
Al g er i an gov ernme n t t h er e were two sch ools o f thought o n no w 
1992 ) . The first alterna tive was , o f c ourse , a n imme d ia t e a no 
f i r m c r a ckd own on the Is lamic r esurgence . 
o pti on c ho s en by t he g over nmen t , i t is eas i e r f o r o b server s 
e \1a l t.ta t e t h e :i mrne d iate effects of t h e a c t ion . Ir1 the 
throug h its ac~1ons the army has d elegit i mized it s elf i n the 
abor ted ~ne very d P mnrr ~ rv t hat i t s g overnmen~ h ad rrP~ tPri _ 
ine coup will also likely prove short-sighted because 
ul tirr~atel y only antagonize the FIS membership. This 
pnenomenon has already been demonstrated in ~ne aftermath of 
+~l-.-ez.::='\.!"~r'"' 
· - •. -- - .• - - - :ii 
ana other cities 
Arrorrling TD a February, 1992 article in 
~ ... - i ' ae11eve ~ney were 
robbed of their vote are now in danger cf 
desperation to the men with machine guns. 
C[)L\.10 make that 
uprising in the wesT Bank" ("Fear," 1992 , p.~o,. 
The other alternative to the FLN-controlled 
government was ~1m~iy to permit the Salvation Front's elected 
officials to take office. 
targets to criticize. 
nas been quite ineffective, ~ t lP~~t within the everyday 
~ : ::- .,. .... ~ 
ma~~ers OT 1oca1 governmen~ 
i r:effect i ve at level= The FISa n unth i r1k i ng 
commitment to unfettered free enterprise" ana an 1~1~mir form 
gc::\/ernn1211t ano 
accelerate the country' s awareness of ~ne party's lack of 
g o verning expertise ("How to ~" 1992). As King Has san of 
- . . -51. ~UaT:J.C)1"1:-
A second advantage in allowing take 
nave been that d ifferences within the ~?rty rn11lrl have led it 
{ 7 1 ! ~- ... ==,, C: 
. . ·· · -· ·=- 19'?2) • The FIS 
1s home to s uch varied members as r adic~l terrorist zealots 
c '\..! c: + c:: r n. 
-· 7 -· ""''-- ~=· ,2 
q:. ?r t-°~ r:rl?1·r.=:.l"'.!-t=+ 
. . - . . . . : . . - . " . ~ . . ... ' ' ' DrDLlQflT the 
FLN the kind of relatively free demoLJaLy that it desired but 
Just as likely would have been the 
possibility of the disparate party splitting i nto open 
factions under the pressure of governing. This scenari c) 
had the added advantage of clearing 
The the 
Islamic Salvat i on Front is the unlikelihood of the FIS ever 
.. - - ~ . - ~ 
re11nqu1sn1ng 1~. Many Al~Pri~n ~ fear that the democratic 
theri be 
Justifica tion for 
thi s fear can be readily found in the FIS' own statements and 
its leaders' ~~PPrnps_ They have spoken of goals such as a 
nnn - rlPmnrr ~tir Tslamir form of government, reduction of 
opportunities for women to work outside the home, segregated-
. , . 
"':.JP1 ~ - ~J.p;;:::;i.r 11-·g and 
1.::;·::) 
} .... \._ 
prohibition of all , ' , d.lC[)fH)l-= If it had gained a two-thirds 
maJori~y 1n the Algerian parliament, the FIS would h a v e had 
the vote s necessary to rn~n~P the constitution and institute 
t he s poken-of Islamic law. Even if a fundame ntalist ma jority 
naa oroven too troub lesome for the current regime, though , 
fi nal power would have rested with the Presi d ent until 
If the National Assemb ly wo u ld have rej e cte d 
he CC)Uld and legitimately dissolved 
parliament ("How to," 1992). 1n1s presidential author ity 
s hou]d have assuaged the F LN 's immediate fears about 
s ur rendering power. 
Di scussion and Conclusion 
1 :::- the religion o f the 
Alger ians , a n d it 1s an especially powerful s hi eld b ehind 
wn 1cn they can unite in ~ne face of aggression. T t-:: i =· 
repeatedl y throughout 2 00 
1n~~~nrP b ei ng t he ir res istance 
to the French i n the 1830s and 1840s. I slam was not J U S~ a 
cultural achi e vement s o f Ar a b s a nd Nor th Afri cans in general. 
The members of t h e early rP~ist~nrP were not necessari ly 
faithful Muslims, n owever; t h ey si mp l y united 1n a coalition 
beh i nd Islam to achieve a common end. The FLN itself 1aTe2r 
identified with 1s 1a m to gain the s upport of t h e nation 1n 
o rde r t o final l y oust France i n the wa r for Al~Pr~~n 
independence~ These historical movemenTs differ with the 
CLtrrent FIS mc!ve1-nents 1I1 c!ne impr)rta11t re:.pect: they un1-i::ea 
Algeria 1s deeply divided. The Front' s chances aT political 
suc cess are h urt oy these divisions b oth within the par ~y and 
with the rest of society . 
almos t never ceased ~o f unct ion s ince Tne e nd of the 
eighteenth century" 1981 ; p.121). This cont i nuity 1s 
the o nly important si milar ity nrtwrPn p,:=: 1- ! ... ] 
- -·· - ~ 
resistance to the French a nd t h e modern fund a mentalist 
n~~n~,t,nn TD the government. HS with memoers of the P~rliPr 
re~,st~nrr move me nt , it is clear t hat all the mrmhrr s O T T ne 
FIS a re not members for ~ ~ - -purely re11g1ous reasons. They are 
dissatisfied with the way t h ings a re , and Islamic 
funrl~mrn~a1i~m 1s ~ne vehicle for their di s content . Thus, 
once again , Islam is a tool for g r ~~~rnn~ s r9~i~t~nrr tn 
government and outside power s. Understandably~ the Is l amic 
Salvat i on Front has fac:t c)r ~-
AlnPri2 1 ~ woeful 
• • ·- ":::l' - • - ·- · -
. . ~ ~ . 
economic s1~ua~1on . The F IS appP~l ~ ~o "the 
j obless y oung , it is untainted h y a~snri~tinn with previous 
governments, and it h as in the mosques a ready ma ae networ k 
for s pre ading the word" ("Algeria steps into~ " 
The Al gerian elec tions o n . . r1ave =-er, ·r. ~-i !~ J1a l =· 
throughout the world, but especially t o the Al ~Pri~n 
government and other Arab states. The current rise of Moslem 
fundamentalism may not oe a completely religious movement, 
but it is a powerful one. arm)l maintains 
power it will be interfering with a legitimate movement that 
will likely continue to grow, just as Islamic resistance 
movements have previously in Algeria. 
r.c:r.c.r. l 1..·~n 
. . . .. . - - .. -: it 
repression or the FIS (Hermida, Zune s, et al). 
to s ay that the FIS will 
take over violently, the result could be similar to what 
happened in Iran: moderate Islamicists in that nation were 
el iminated in the revolution's a.no rao1ca1s 
the reins by themselves (Zunes, 1992). A more likely resu lt 
is the continuation 211d LH"1rest that have plagued 
Algeria in the last e1../eJ1 
that repression will escalate ti1e . , . ·:..?°::":!C:.::l~i:":C:.,., C :!!r::"; - .. - . . - .. . -:- .. . - . . 
poi1cy 1s another easy target for the FIS' criticism, a nd 
coul d in fact lead to further 
. " "" repression oy ~ne D. 1 ;-;,::,-,- ~ =,,;-, . - - -_; · ..... . i=-:i 11 
.. .. ' -coun~erproauc~1ve 
if the FIS is victorious, it 
more than set Algeria's mnriPrni ?atinn oacK a century. 
i I1 be 
faced ¥Jith the dilemma of either making concessions to the 
opposition or dealing w1~n the continuation of destructive 
If 
pluralism and compromise are not included in the formula for 
government, the result will be a setback for relative peace 
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